Let's Talk About That Ryanair Window Incident - And Why Jeff Guzzetti's Comments Don't Hold Up

Aerospace Quality Systems Expert Daryl Guberman - A 40 year Quality Veteran And Boeing shareholder - Speaks Directly To Readers About What Really Happened, Why The New York Post Article Misses The Point, And Why former FAA official Jeff Guzzetti's commentary is compromised by the FAA's Long Standing Entanglement With Boeing And His Continued Affiliation With An Organization Financially Tied To An accreditation Body That Perpetrated Federal deception.

FEATURE ARTICLE

When a window shatters at 30,000 feet, the world looks for a culprit. But in the boardrooms of aviation, the real story isn't about a seal or a bolt-it's about a two-decade-old systemic collapse that turns every component into a potential liability.

April 17, 2024, under penalty of ejection or arrest, I stood before the DHS Subcommittee during whistleblower Sam Salehpour's testimony on Boeing 777/787 design issues - holding up two Boeing supplier bulletins from 2002 April & July proving Boeing instructed suppliers to send in certifications and parts into their aerospace supply chain which from 2002 to present never had AS9100 certification.

https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/apr/18/3749044/

Before I go any further, let's get one thing straight:

The Ryanair window didn't "just blow out."

It failed because a piece of the engine flew off, hit the fuselage, and shattered the window. Ryanair's O'Leary Says Boeing Management Continue To Disappoint. QA Expert Daryl Guberman Agrees https://youtu.be/kdBAlzLAsa8

That's the real sequence of events - and it matters, because it means the engine had an uncontained failure, the most serious kind of conformity breakdown in aviation.

If you've read the New York Post article -
https://nypost.com/2026/07/18/lifestyle/ryanair-window-incident-expert-reveals-who-might-be-at-fault/ -you probably saw former FAA official Jeff Guzzetti giving his take on "who might be at fault."

Let me talk to you directly, reader to reader, expert to citizen.

Jeff's comments?
They don't hold water.

And here's why.
"This wasn't a random window failure - it was triggered by an engine conformity breakdown."

I've been in aerospace quality for 40 years.

I don't deal in guesses.

I deal in AS9100, the standard that governs aerospace manufacturing and supplier oversight.

So let me say this plainly:

The window failed because the engine failed first.
That's the truth.
That's the sequence.
That's the conformity chain.

When an engine throws a piece of hardware, that is:
• a containment failure
• a conformity failure
• a supplier oversight failure
• a traceability failure
• a production control failure

And when that debris hits the fuselage and shatters a window, that window becomes the secondary victim of the primary engine failure.
There's no mystery.
There's no speculation.
There's no "who might be at fault."

There is only nonconforming output - and AS9100 demands root cause analysis.
"Jeff worked for the FAA - and the FAA has been in bed with Boeing for years."
I'm going to be blunt with you, because you deserve the truth.

Jeff Guzzetti- comes from an agency that:

THE GUBERMAN INSIGHT"BOEING UNDER THE LENS: https://guberman-quality.com/boeing-under-a-lens-the-guberman-insight/

• gave Boeing expanded levity in 2009
• allowed Boeing to self police through delegated authority
• maintained that system until 346 people died in two crashes Ethiopian & Indonesian airlines.
• sits on the accreditation body ANAB Management System Accreditation Committee that can grant, suspend & withdraw certification (2014-2024) Boeing forced onto suppliers since July 2002
• never required Boeing to be AS9100 certified
• never stopped Boeing from issuing the 2002 supplier memos
• never corrected Boeing's 24 year certification void

THE VP of Quality, ELIZABETH LUND CONTRADICTION-ADMISSION NO AS9100 CERTIFICATION JULY 2002 - PRESENT:
On June 27, 2024, Boeing executive Elizabeth Lund stated publicly that Boeing was:
• " Willing & prepared to get AS9100,"
• "Compliant to the standard," and
• "Doing internal audits as if they were certified."
https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/boeing-brief-european-regulators-production-090603535.html ( Last paragraph in this article "willing and prepared")

My investigation shows these statements were not accurate.

OCTOBER 2024: I WENT TO BOEING FACILITIES

In October 2024, I traveled to Boeing's major Washington State sites - Everett, Renton, Auburn, and Northfield - to verify Lund's claims.

What I found was stark:
• No employees knew what AS9100 was
• No internal audits were being performed
• No audit trail existed
• Employees were discouraged from attending safety meetings because "the plane had to be moved to the next station"
GUBERMAN DISCOVERY:https://guberman-quality.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GUBERMAN-DISCOVERY-2026.pdf

So, when Jeff comments on the Ryanair window incident, understand this:
He's speaking from inside a compromised oversight structure.
His perspective is not independent.

It's not neutral.
And it's not AS9100 aligned.
That's why his commentary is a moot point.
"Now let me tell you what AS9100 actually says."

AS9100 has specific clauses that apply directly to this incident:
• 8.4 - Supplier control
• 8.5.1 - Production control
• 8.5.2 - Traceability
• 8.6 - Product release
• 8.7 - Nonconforming outputs
If a window fails, one or more of these clauses were violated.
Period.

AS9100 doesn't care about opinions.
It cares about conformity.

"Now let me tell you what Boeing did after 9/11 - because this is the smoking gun."

This is the part the public never hears.
After 9/11, Boeing issued two supplier memos - one in April 2002 and one in July 2002 - and these memos changed everything.

The April 2002 memo

This memo told suppliers handling special processes - heat treat, welding, plating, coatings, all the flight critical stuff - that they could:
"Send your certificate and send your parts."
That was the directive.
Plain and simple.

The July 2002 memo
This memo told every supplier:
"You must be AS9100 and accredited by ANAB."

But here's the part that blows the whole system apart:
Boeing itself wasn't AS9100 certified - not in 2002, not in 2008 when the Ryanair aircraft was built, and not for the next 24 years.

They forced suppliers into an accreditation system they themselves refused to participate in.

And here's the dagger:

Both memos - April and July - told suppliers:
"Send your certificate, send your parts, and if the need arises or need be, Boeing will show up at your door."

That's not quality oversight.
That's intimidation wrapped in a memo.

"Now let's talk about the engine - because this is where the truth hits hard."
The Ryanair aircraft was built in March 2008 - six years into Boeing's certification void.

It was flying with legacy CFM56 7B engines, not new replacements.
And here's the part the public keeps getting wrong:
The window didn't just "blow out."

A piece of the engine flew off and hit the fuselage - that's what broke the window.

That means the engine had an uncontained failure - the most serious kind of engine failure in aviation.

So the window wasn't the first failure.

The window was the victim of the first failure.

And here's the AS9100 truth nobody in the FAA or Boeing wants to say:
An uncontained engine failure is a conformity failure.

A window shattering from engine debris is a secondary conformity failure.
Both failures trace back to the same broken accreditation chain.

And here's the dagger:

If an engine was built in an AS9100 certified shop and then brought into Boeing's uncertified environment, that engine becomes SUP - Suspected Unapproved Product - the moment it crosses Boeing's threshold.

That's aerospace law.
That's AS9100.
That's conformity.
And that's the real story behind the Ryanair incident.
"I warned Ryanair in 2024 - and AS9100 requires corrective action."
Two years ago, I told Ryanair leadership about systemic quality issues affecting OEMs and suppliers.

AS9100 Clause 10.2 says:

If you're warned about a conformity risk, you must act.
If you don't, that's a corrective action failure.
"The real problem isn't Ryanair - it's the global accreditation collapse."

This incident is part of a much bigger failure:

• Boeing's 24 year certification void
• ANAB's accreditation instability
• IAF's governance consolidation
• CNAS/IAF leadership overlap
• the 2018 DOS contract binding federal procurement to IAF/ANAB
• the collapse of the global conformity chain
Jeff is looking at this through an operational lens.
But AS9100 requires a quality systems lens.
And from that perspective, the truth is simple:
The conformity chain is broken.

"Now let's talk about Jeff Guzzetti's AIAA connection - because this is where the impartiality collapse becomes undeniable."

Jeff Guzzetti is not just a former FAA official.

He is publicly affiliated with the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) - an organization that sits on the ANSI-ANAB board and pays membership dues directly into ANSI's accreditation structure.

Here's the documented proof:

Jeff Guzzetti's AIAA profile:
https://aiaa.org/people/jeff-guzzetti/

This profile shows Guzzetti participating in AIAA's 2022 Aviation Forum - four years after ANAB perpetrated a sham on the U.S. Department of State under Contract 19AQMM18R0131.

The 2018 DOS sham - Contract 19AQMM18R0131 THE GUBERMAN ANOMOLY-DISCOVERY https://guberman-quality.com/guberman-anomaly-discovery/ (pages 3-7)

In 2018, ANAB falsely claimed to be an "underwriter" on a Department of State contract - a role explicitly prohibited under ISO/IEC 17011, the international standard governing accreditation body impartiality.
This is not a clerical error.

It is a violation of federal contract integrity and international impartiality rules.
Yet AIAA continued paying membership dues into ANSI-ANAB after the sham.
And Guzzetti continued his involvement with AIAA after the sham.

That means:

Jeff Guzzetti remained professionally tied to an organization financially supporting an accreditation body that had already violated federal contract integrity.

This is not just aerospace.
ANSI-ANAB-"2018 DOS Contact 19AQMM18R0131-sham" and their international equivalents under MRA-MLA (Multi-Regional/Lateral Agreements reach extends across:

• medical devices
• pharmaceuticals
• food safety
• defense contracting
• cybersecurity
• environmental testing
• consumer products
• automotive
• electronics
• construction materials
• chemical manufacturing
• energy systems
• laboratories and calibration services

Suppliers across these industries continue producing parts under the false assurance of accreditation bodies that have already violated impartiality and federal contract integrity.

And here's the dagger:

Five federal agencies - DOJ, DHS, DOC, FDA, and DOS - are not only members of ANSI-ANAB but customers.

They pay into the same accreditation body that violated federal contract rules and still are paying into a sham.
This is the ecosystem Jeff Guzzetti is part of.
This is the ecosystem he speaks from.
This is why his commentary is compromised.

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PRESS CONTACT:
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About Daryl Guberman
I'm a 40 year aerospace quality systems expert, Boeing shareholder, and founder of G PMC LLC - the only independent accreditation body not tied to the IAF/ANAB equivalence chain. I've provided forensic evidence to international regulators, like THE GUBERMAN ANALYSIS https://guberman-quality.com/the-guberman-analysis/ (Illustrates it was system failure not toggle switch or pilot error in 2025 Air India 787 crash, I sent the document to the DGCA -INDIA & CAAC-CHINA testified before DHS, and filed official documentation with the FAA, including my formal public comment submitted under FAA 2026 3879 0003 https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FAA-2026-3879-0003

This release was published on openPR.